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Abstract
The evolution of modern voice-controlled devices (VCDs) has revolutionized
the Internet of Things (IoT), and resulted in increased realization of smart
homes, personalization and home automation through voice commands. These
VCDs can be exploited in IoT driven environment to generate various spoofing
attacks including the chain of replay attacks (multi-order replay attacks). Ex-
isting datasets like ASVspoof and ReMASC contain only the first-order replay
recordings, therefore, they cannot offer evaluation of the anti-spoofing algo-
rithms capable of detecting the multi-order replay attacks. Additionally, these
datasets do not capture the characteristics of microphone arrays, which is an
important characteristic of modern VCDs. Therefore, there exists an urgent
need to have a diverse replay spoofing detection corpus that consists of multi-
order replay recordings against the bonafide voice samples. This paper presents
a novel voice spoofing detection corpus (VSDC) to evaluate the performance
of multi-order replay anti-spoofing methods. The proposed VSDC consists of
first-order- and second-order-replay samples against the bonafide audio record-
ings. We ensured to create a diverse replay spoofing detection corpus in terms of
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environment, recording and playback devices, human speakers, configurations,
replay scenarios, etc. More specifically, we used 22 microphones, 25 different
recording configurations, 54 different playback configurations for first-order- and
second-order-replays to generate a total of 11,772 samples belonging to fifteen
human speakers. Additionally, the proposed VSDC can also be used to evaluate
the performance of speaker verification systems. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first publicly available replay spoofing detection corpus comprising of
first-order- and second-order-replay samples.
Keywords: , Multi-order Voice Replay Attack, Multimedia of Things, Voice
Replay Spoofing, Voice Controlled Devices, Automatic Speaker Verification
Anti-spoofing, Voice Spoofing Dataset
1. Introduction
The growing trend of personalization, realization of smart homes, and the
desire for easy control of home devices are driving factors for the tremendous
evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Voice assistant, a software com-
ponent of voice-controlled devices (VCD) such as Google home, Amazon Echo
and Siri etc., is becoming an essential component of Internet of Things (IoT). In
near future, VCDs are expected to have capability of processing both audio and
video, and is expected to introduce a new subfield of IoT, called Multimedia of
Thing (MoT). MoT devices, a subset of IoT devices, are equipped with micro-
phones, cameras and speakers. VCDs are susceptible to various audio spoofing
attacks such as replay attacks, voice cloning attacks, etc., while MoT devices
face various multimedia spoofing challenges including deepfakes [19].
The voice assistants have enabled enormous connectivity among VCDs and are
opening vistas of new research [5]. Particularly, the addition of microphones
arrays and speakers enable these devices to engage in two-way communication,
allowing them to play audio and accept voice commands from other IoT devices.
The most recognizable feature of VCDs has been the capability to connect all
household IoT devices together with voice commands. Voice assistants are now
2
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Figure 1: Voice-controlled devices connectivity to send/receive audios in the home.
being directly integrated into thermostats, refrigerators, light switches, enter-
tainment systems and cars. It is important to mention that many IoT devices
in smart homes are controlled remotely through VCDs. In addition to control-
ling IoT devices in the home, integrated voice assistants are also being used to
bring a variety of Internet based applications related to these VCDs such as en-
tertainment, communication, shopping, healthcare, business, banking services,
etc. With so many devices in a home being able to provide a voice assistant, the
system resembles the dream of science fiction television where an omnipresent
computer is constantly ready to provide quick and easy verbal access. The
VCDs themselves could be used to replay audio to each other forming the basis
of multi-hop scenarios. The open space inside a home becomes a transmission
medium through which one VCD can replay voice commands to another VCD.
Figure 1 illustrates how a smart home can have many VCDs capable of speaking
to each other.
Most VCDs are equipped with array microphones which means they have more
than one microphone. The Amazon Echo Dot 3 uses an array of 4 microphones.
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This array of microphones allows the VCD to determine the location of the hu-
man speaker, selection of the best microphone and use the other microphones
to reject background noise. This configuration allows VCDs to pick up voice
command at long distances (few meters) in less than ideal conditions. This fact
enables the VCD to be more susceptible to replay attacks.
Audio-specific spoofing attacks can be categorized into replay [12], speech-
synthesis (SS) [13], voice conversion (VC) [14] and impersonation [17]. Among
all audio spoofing attacks, replay attacks could be more prevalent in the fu-
ture, as less tech savvy intruders can generate them and disrupt the automatic
speaker verification system of a VCD based system [15]. Existing spoofing
datasets [2, 3, 16] are designed for evaluation of testbeds that consider replay
spoofing as a two-class classification problem. The application focus of these
datasets is mainly evaluating voice driven banking systems and they only ad-
dress the scenario of a one-time replay. However, we have demonstrated through
the experimentation in our earlier work [5] that VCDs are very vulnerable to
even second-order replay attacks and are unable to clearly classify between the
original and spoof samples in multi-hop scenarios. This vulnerability of VCDs
can easily be exposed by an intruder to cause severe financial loss and data
theft. Additionally, existing datasets i.e. ASVspoof do not contains the audio
samples recorded from devices having array of microphones. Therefore, there
exists a need to create a replay spoofing dataset to evaluate applications and
testbeds that may involve multi-hop voice propagation scenarios and samples
recorded with devices having microphone arrays. For this purpose, we designed
a novel voice spoofing detection corpus (VSDC) for multi-hop replay scenarios
that consist of bonafide, first-order- and second-order-replay audio samples. Ad-
ditionally, we tried to ensure that our replay dataset should be diverse in terms
of recording environment, background noise, recording and playback devices,
microphones, speakers, replay scenarios, etc. It is important to mention that
the proposed dataset is unique and first-one to consider the multi-hop replay
scenarios.
The main contributions of this paper are:
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1. Development of a large-scale dataset for evaluation of audio forensics testbed.
2. Development of a multi-order replay dataset consisting of bonafide, first-order
replay and second-order replay samples that can effectively be used to evaluate
the performance of anti-spoofing methods in multi-hop scenarios.
3. We ensured to create a diverse replay spoofing detection corpus in terms of
environment, recording and playback devices, human speakers, configurations,
replay scenarios, etc. More specifically, we used 22 microphones, 25 unique
recording configurations, 54 unique playback configurations to generate a to-
tal of 11772 samples belonging to fifteen human speakers of different age and
gender.
2. Landscape of Multi-hop replay attacks
In this section we briefly discuss the landscape of replay attacks involving the
voice-controlled devices (VCDs). The addition of a voice interface introduces a
new attack surface to be exploited in homes, offices, businesses and hospitals.
These scenarios demonstrate that multiple-replays on the VCDs can be used to
exploit the systems having voice interfaces. Although we discuss the scenarios
of smart homes in this paper, the threats associated with the replay attacks
can go beyond the homes and voice-controlled applications being developed
for smart cities, futuristic cars, and other businesses. Amazon has already
launched its smart assistant Alexa for businesses automation [7]. Currently,
Amazon is working on healthcare apps that use smart speakers to perform
various tasks [6]. The details of a few representative scenarios involving the
multi-order replay attacks are discussed below. It is important to mention that
we have experimentally verified these scenarios.
2.1. Scenario 1: Webcam Replay
Shown in Figure 2 are the two scenarios where VCDs are used to replay
audio to each other. In scenario 1, a compromised webcam is able to listen a
user giving commands to a Google Home device. In such a scenario, a webcam
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can be accessed by compromising the homes WiFi network using a tool i.e.
Aircrack-NG [11]. The study of Common vulnerability and exposures (CVEs)
[8] shows that there exist many vulnerabilities that allow unauthenticated access
to the webcams these days. After capturing the victims audio from his home,
the attacker can use the webcam to replay commands to a Google Home device
in the absence of victim. This demonstrates a traditional replay attack with
only one (1) point of replay. The webcam in this scenario could also be a baby
monitor or other compromised VCD. We have verified through experiments that
Google Home devices only authenticate the user based on the wake word Hey
Google. As long as the audio recording of the user saying, Hey Google in this
scenario is clear enough then an attacker can replay the wake phrase and insert
any subsequent command i.e. Open Garage Door.
2.1.1. Scenario 2: Drop-In Replay
In the scenario 2 shown in Figure 2(b), we describe a situation where an
attacker obtains an original recording of a victim (this can be accomplished for
example by the attacker recording a phone call of the user). The attacker intends
to replay the audio from his home to the victims home. The Amazon Echo
devices offer a feature that allows audio conferencing between these devices.
This feature a.k.a Drop-In works even between different homes and Echo devices
owned by different people as long as their contact list permissions are set to allow
that contact to Drop-In. When using the Drop-In mode, the receiving Amazon
Echo device plays a small chime and changes the devices light ring to green, thus
enabling the conference mode. The presence of the recipient of the conference
call is not required as the conference mode is enabled without any additional
verification. If another VCD is nearby then commands can be replayed through
the audio conference.
If an attacker is able to get himself, for example, on Bobs contact list and
allow himself the Drop-In permission then the attacker could start the audio
conference between Amazon Echo VCDs at any time. The actions that the
attacker would take are asking their Amazon Echo Drop in on Bob. The attacker
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could then replay the command Hey Google, open the garage door. Although
this scenario requires that Bobs Amazon Alexa contact list should be exploited
by the attacker gaining access to Bobs smartphone however, this scenario is
plausible as a smartphone can be accessed by a trusted individual such as a
friend, co-worker or child.
This replay attack scenario demonstrates as proof-of-concept that VCDs in the
home are vulnerable to replay attacks as long as the victims audio can be played
in front of VCD in the home. This scenario is an example of a multi-hop replay
attack as the original audio is replayed once to an Amazon Echo and then
replayed again from the victims Amazon Echo device. We observed during the
multi-hop replay scenarios that signal degradation due to multiple replays are
unable to cause any problem as long as the playback audio is audible. While
this scenario used two Amazon Echo devices, they could be replaced with other
devices capable of transmitting audio such as a smart phone App being used to
transmit audio to a webcam in another home.
2.1.2. Scenario 3: Drop-In Multi-Home Replay
In scenario 3 (Figure 2c), we describe a situation where an attacker has
managed to exploit a vulnerability in a webcam remotely and is able to access
the cameras audio and video stream. The camera is conveniently located in
the kitchen near an Amazon Echo device. The attacker can easily identify the
presence of the victims at home and observe their interactions with the VCD
through accessing the camera. The Amazon Echo device itself does not have any
voice verification system to verify the authenticity of any person. The attacker
can cause chaos at the victims home during his absence by issuing commands to
change the thermostat settings, turning on and off the lights, opening the garage
door, etc. from the webcam. Every IoT device in the home that is connected
to the Amazon Echo is now accessible to the attacker.
The Amazon Echo Drop-In feature causes an additional threat in this situa-
tion. If the homeowner has allowed the Drop-In mode between friends, family
members or even the workplace then the attacker will also have access to start
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an audio conference between other Amazon Echo devices. At this point the
attacker could Drop-In to another Amazon Alexa located in another family
members home. If there happens to be another VCD nearby, the attacker can
then attempt to control IoT devices in the second home as well. In this scenario,
the attacker can easily control another home remotely through the Drop-In fea-
ture.
While we proposed few scenarios, it can be assumed that the device with the
weakest security will be exploited. Many VCDs such as webcams are known to
have vulnerabilities that expose their credentials or audio streams due to the
nature of being mass produced cheaply in quick time. Once a VCD has been ex-
ploited then an attacker can have multiple options from listening and collecting
audio to replaying audio or cloned voice.
3. Dataset
This paper presents a unique voice spoofing detection corpus (VSDC) con-
sisting of the bonafide, 1st-order and 2nd-order replay recordings by setting up
different scenarios of chained VCDs. This multi-hop replay feature in our cor-
pus can be used to evaluate the performance of different replay anti-spoofing
algorithms in terms of classification among the bonafide, first-order and second-
order replay attacks. More specifically, our dataset can effectively be used to
investigate the performance of audio replay spoofing detection algorithms under
diverse recording and playback environments, configurations, and devices. Ad-
ditionally, our proposed VSDC can also be used to evaluate the performance of
speaker verification systems as our corpus includes the audio samples of fifteen
different speakers. It must be noted that all audio samples in our dataset are of
six (6) seconds in duration to ensure uniformity when using the bonafide and
spoof samples to train different machine-learning classifiers.
3.1. Definitions and Data Collection Strategy
As this paper discusses the idea of multiple points/order of replays, we need
to define the terminology used to specify the given point of replay. We will refer
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2nd Point
of Replay
Attacker has control of IoT in
home of victim 1.
Using drop in feature
attacker has control of IoT in
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Attacker exploits webcam
in home of victim 1
“Alexa, Set thermostat to 90”
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Figure 2: Three replay attack scenarios. a) Webcam Replay. b) Drop-In Replay. c) Drop-In
Multi-Home Replay.
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Figure 3: Dataset creation configuration.
to the bonafide recording of a person giving voice commands to a VCD as the
zero point of replay or (0PR). When the original recording is replayed from an
audio speaker, we will refer to the output audio as the first point of replay or
(1PR). Similarly, when the 1PR audio is replayed through a chained VCD then
we will refer to that output audio as the second point of replay or (2PR).
Shown in Figure 3 is the process of capturing audio to create the dataset con-
sisting of 0PR, 1PR and 2PR. The bonafide phrases (0PR files) can be captured
on any recording device. The 0PR files are then copied to a PC for generating
the replays. The PC replays the 0PR file to an audio speaker creating the 1PR
audio. VCDs are setup in an audio conference mode so that the audio played
at 1PR is replayed by the VCD at 2PR. The PC used for creating the data
sample is simultaneously replaying the 0PR file while capturing the resulting
1PR and 2PR audio. The USB sound card connected to the PC in Figure 3 can
be replaced by the onboard sound card of the PC or with a sound interface box.
For the data collection, we used the Audacity tool [9] to simultaneously play
the 0PR audio while capturing the resulting 1PR and 2PR audio. The audacity
tool can play from one audio track while simultaneously records audio on other
tracks. To capture replays, a scenario is setup like two Amazon Echo devices
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in the conference mode to create a chain of VCDs. Audacity is setup with the
bonafide (0PR) recording on track 1. The PC plays the audio to a connected
audio speaker, this output audio is recorded on track 2 by Audacity and be-
comes the 1PR recording. At the same time, VCD replays the audio to the next
device in the chain. The resulting output is recorded on track 3 by Audacity and
becomes the 2PR recording. Using this method, we captured the 1PR and 2PR
replays in real time. It was necessary to maintain proper isolation between the
1PR and 2PR environments to ensure that each respective microphone would
not receive the same sound as the other (e.g. the 2PR microphone would not
overhear the sound coming from the audio speaker used in the 1PR environ-
ment). Audacity is then used to trim the samples into 6 second duration. All
data samples at 0PR, 1PR and 2PR are exported as separate files.
3.2. Voice Commands and Recording Subjects
Shown in Table 1, forty-two (42) different phrases consisting of typical com-
mands given to VCDs are used in creating the bonafide recordings. All com-
mands start with the activation phrase Hey Google, Computer or Alexa. Some
of the voice commands used for recordings are as follows, Ok Google, turn on
the kitchen light or Computer, turn off living room light. The phrasing of giv-
ing a command using the activation word Computer reflects that replay attacks
are not a vendor specific issue. These genuine utterances form the basis of our
bonafide recordings. A total of fifteen (15) human speakers, ages 18-60 years
old, participated in data collection. Out of fifteen (15) human speakers, ten (10)
are male, and five (5) are female. Some of the human speakers are not native
English speakers. Each human speaker recorded the original file by repeating a
given set of phrases typical of commands given to VCDs. Some of the volunteers
recorded these original phrase sets multiple times using different microphones
in diverse environments. In total 198 different 0PR source sets, consisting of at
least 9 phrases, are created resulting in 1,926 0PR source phrases being spoken.
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Table 1: Phrases used for 0PR samples.
Phrases
Computer, turn on office lamp Hey Google, turn off bedroom lamp
Computer, turn off office lamp Hey Google, turn on living room light
Computer, turn on kitchen lights Hey Google, turn off living room light
Computer, turn off kitchen lights Hey Google, who am I
Computer, turn on bedroom lamp Hey Google, give me an easter egg
Computer, turn off bedroom lamp Hey Google, good morning
Computer, turn on living room light Hey Google, tell me a joke
Computer, turn off living room light Hey Google, beam me up
Computer, who am I Hey Google, set phasers to kill
Hey Google, turn on office lamp Hey Google, tea, earl grey, hot
Hey Google, turn off office lamp Hey Google, my name is Inigo Montoya
Hey Google, turn on kitchen lights Hey Google, I want the truth
Hey Google, turn off kitchen lights Hey Google, turn on bedroom lamp
Alexa Turn, on office lamp Alexa, my name is Inigo Montoya
Alexa Turn, off office lamp Alexa, I want the truth
Alexa, turn on kitchen lights Alexa,turn off kitchen lights
Alexa, turn on bedroom lamp Alexa, turn off bedroom lamp
Alexa, turn on living room light Alexa, turn off living room light
Alexa, give me an Easter egg Alexa, good morning
Alexa, tell me a joke Alexa, beam me up
Alexa, set phasers to kill Alexa, tea, earl grey, hot
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Figure 4: Environments used for 0PR Recordings. (a) Bedroom, (b) Car Off Light Rain, (c)
Car On, (d) Car On Light Rain, (e) Kitchen Table, (f) Computer lab, (g) Computer Lab with
Music, (h) Office Desk, (i) University Cafe, (j) University Courtyard.
3.3. 0PR Environments
The 0PR environment is the area where the bonafide sound samples are
recorded. The voice spoofing detection corpus (VSDC) includes the samples
recorded at ten (10) different unique environments (for 0PR) that contain dif-
ferent amounts of ambient noise. We recorded the samples in different envi-
ronments to ensure the diversity. The environments considered noisy, are the
Computer Lab with Music, Car Off with light rain, Car on with Light Rain,
Cafeteria, and University CourtYard. The Computer Lab with Music environ-
ment contained ambient noise from loud music. Both the Car on with Light
Rain and Car Off with Light Rain environments are deemed as noisy due to the
consistent pattering of rain and surrounding cars. The Cafeteria environment
contains the undertones from discourse. The University Courtyard environment
contains rustling trees and background conversations. The environments classi-
fied as low noise are, the Office Desk, Kitchen Table, Bedroom, and Computer
Lab. All indoor environments contain less significant background noise from air
circulation systems.
3.4. Playback Environments
For playback environments, we used the mini audio booths, lab classrooms,
and library study rooms to create the 1PR and 2PR replays. The brief descrip-
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Playback Environments.(a) Inside Mini recording booth, (b) Study Room, (c) Com-
puter Lab.
tion of each environment is given below.
Mini Audio Booths. As shown in Figure 5(a), we designed the mini audio booths
to eliminate the background sounds, i.e. sound of computer fans and air condi-
tioners. Producing replay recordings in the audio booths allowed us to analyze
the audio signals without ambient noise. The mini audio booths are effective in
reducing ambient environmental noises. We used the SPL meter to determine
the sound pressure level that recorded 40dBA for quiet office and 35.8 dBA
inside the mini audio booth. Further testing shows that a large fan running
40 inches away from the microphone would produce a sound level of 56.5 dBA
and 40.8 dBA in the office and audio booth respectively. Moreover, running a
vacuum cleaner produces a level of 70 dBA in the office and 42.5 dBA inside
the audio booth. More specifically, we created two audio booths one each for
1PR recordings and 2PR recordings. Shown in Figure 5(a) is the setup at 1PR,
where a Bluetooth speaker is replaying an original audio sample. The Amazon
Echo Dot is set to the Drop-In audio-conferencing mode so that it can replay
the audio to another Echo Dot in second audio booth.
Study Room. We selected two study rooms inside the library to design the 1PR
and 2PR playback environments (Figure 5b). In the first study room, we setup
the 1PR playback equipment that includes the laptop, one Echo dot device,
microphone and connecting cables. In the second study room, we created the
2PR playback environments where we used an Echo dot device and a microphone
connected with the cables. It should be mentioned that these study rooms
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contained the noise from the air circulation system and footsteps.
Computer Lab. The computer lab playback environment used two computer
labs adjacent to each other. One computer lab (Figure 5c) is used for conducting
the 1PR replay, where we placed a speaker, microphones and the Echo Dot in
Drop-In mode. In the next computer lab, we arranged the other Echo Dot along
with the necessary microphone to capture the 2PR playback. The computer labs
contain the noise of air circulation systems only.
3.5. Equipment used for recording and playback
For recording the bonafide 0PR source files and the 1PR and 2PR replays,
we used several combinations of microphones and microphone interface devices.
More specifically, we used 22 distinct microphones for audio recordings. Shown
in Table 2 are the combinations of external microphones and their microphone
interface device. Devices with internal microphones are mentioned by the de-
vice name. Several professional grade microphones that use an XLR connection
are used for recording and playback. These microphones are connected to the
PC using an audio interface box. The professional microphones connected by
XLR cables are highlighted in green in Table 2. An external USB microphone
is used for making 0PR recordings. This type of microphone can be charac-
terized as a medium quality microphone and is highlighted in yellow in Table
2. We also used various internal microphones of the laptops and cell phones.
Internal microphones can be characterized as lower quality microphones and are
highlighted in red in Table 2.
Shown in Table 3 are the fourteen (14) 1PR playback configurations used in
the proposed VSDC. The composition of configurations consists of a speaker,
amplifier, and a sound card. We used a variety of speakers ranging from low
to high quality. Devices such as laptops and cell phones that contain built in
speakers represent the low quality, whereas, those using an external speaker
either connected via Bluetooth or aux cable are considered devices of medium
quality. Finally, the higher quality speakers are considered to be the external
15
Table 2: List of all recording microphones and sound cards used.
0PR Recording Configuration
Audio-Technica ST95MKII | Zoom R16
Audio-Technica ST95MKII | Presonus Studio 24
Shure SM58 | Zoom R16
Shure SM58 | Presonus Studio 24
Behringer ECM8000 | Zoom R16
Electro-Voice 635A/B | Zoom R16
Blue Yeti | Mac Book Pro 2018
MacBook Pro 2018 (Internal Microphone)
Acer (Internal Microphone)
Samsung Galaxy S7 (Internal Microphone)
IPhone 5S (Internal Microphone)
(7) Android Phones
1PR and 2PR Recording Configuration
Audio-Technica ST95MKII | Zoom R16
Audio-Technica ST95MKII | Presonus Studio 24
Shure SM58 | Zoom R16
Shure SM58 | Presonus Studio 24
Behringer ECM8000 | Zoom R16
xFormatted as [Microphone] | [soundcard] or [device]. Devices contains an
internal microphone and soundcard.
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Table 3: List of all Playback configurations used in playing back audio in the 1PR recording
environment.
1PR Playback Configuration
Polk R150 Speaker | Yamaha HTR-5840 | ZOOM R16
Polk R150 Speaker | Yamaha HTR-5840 | Asus GL504GM-DS74
Polk R150 Speaker | Yamaha HTR-5840 | USB Audio Card Ugreen 30521
Polk R150 Speaker | Fisher 143 | USB Audio Card Ugreen 30521
Bose 141 Speaker | Yamaha HTR-5840 | USB Audio Card Ugreen 30521
Presonus Eris E5 | ZOOM R16
Presonus Eris E5 | USB Audio Card Ugreen 30521
Bose Soundlink 415859 | Asus GL504GM-DS74 (Wired)
Bose Soundlink 415859 | Asus GL504GM-DS74 (BlueTooth)
SBT6050R | Asus GL504GM-DS74(Wired)
SBT6050R | Asus GL504GM-DS74(BlueTooth)
MacBook Pro 2018 (Internal Speaker)
Acer Nitro Spin 5 (Internal Speaker)
Acer Aspire E5-574G (Internal Speaker)
speakers with the manufacturer’s specifications reporting that they produce a
sound frequency response near the full range of human hearing of about 80hz -
20,000hz.
Eight (08) different configurations of devices are used to transmit the 1PR
audio having the corresponding 2PR recordings as shown in Table 4. The device
configurations vary from Amazon Echos using the Drop-In audio conferencing
feature to laptops and tablets connected using the Google Meet.
The Amazon Drop-In audio conferencing offers easy transmission of audio from
one location to another using the VCDs. We used several different combinations
of Amazon Echo devices to test their audio quality. All of the Amazon devices
even the previous Generation 2 Echo Dot with smaller speakers are able to
replay commands to another VCD with acceptable results. All Amazon Echo
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Table 4: VCD, 1PR to 2PR Replay Configuration.
Source Target Connection Method
Echo Dot 2 Echo Dot 2 Amazon Drop-In
Echo Dot 2 Echo Dot 3 Amazon Drop-In
Echo Dot 3 Echo Dot 2 Amazon Drop-In
Echo Dot 3 Echo Dot 3 Amazon Drop-In
Echo Dot 3 Echo Plus Gen 2 Amazon Drop-In
Echo Dot 3 Echo Input Amazon Drop-In
LG G6 Asus Tablet Google-Meet
Laptop Laptop Google-Meet
devices contain audio out jacks which allow them to be connected to external
speakers for improved quality. We connected the external speakers for various
sample sets to analyze the changes in the audio signal. We used a variety of
external speakers ranging from small battery powered external speakers, home
theater speakers to studio monitor speakers.
Google-Meet is used as an audio-conferencing service to transmit the 1PR audio
to 2PR. While Google-Meet itself is used on laptops and tablets instead of the
VCDs, still it is a useful way to replay audio to other VCDs. Laptops, tablets
and phones can easily be left at other locations with the intention of replaying
audio to VCDs at a later time. We used the laptops and Google-Meet to ensure
the use of high-quality microphones. The audio quality of the replays is limited
to the quality of Amazon Echos microphone in the configurations where we used
the Amazon Echo devices. It can be expected that competition amongst the
VCD manufacturers will continue to improve their audio capabilities likely to the
point that products will become available for the audiophile market. Therefore,
we conclude that it is worthwhile to study the audio characteristics of replay
attacks on all types of audio equipment.
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Table 5: VCD, 1PR to 2PR Replay Configuration.
Sample set 11
point of Replay (PR) 1PR
Speaker S2
Environment E6
Microphone used for recording M7
Configuration Number C28
Phrase 01
3.6. Data Availability
The dataset is organized into different folders, where each folder has all
the recordings (0PR, 1PR and 2PR) of unique speaker. Each speaker folder
contains three sub-folders including the audio samples of 0PR, 1PR and 2PR.
The naming convention of the file specifies the sample number, point of replay,
speaker, environment, microphone at 0PR and configuration number as shown
in Table 5. The proposed voice spoofing detection corpus is available at [10] for
research purposes.
Sample Set: Indicates the original 0PR file the sample is based from.
Point of Replay: Indicates at which point of replay this sample was created.
Speaker: Human speaker/volunteer who recorded this sample.
Environment: Recording Environment of the 0PR sample.
Microphone used for recording: The microphone that was used for the 0PR
recording.
Configuration Number: The configuration setup that was used to make the 1PR
and 2PR samples. Configuration is based on: Replay Speaker, Replay Device,
1PR to 2PR transmission device and method.
Phrase: In each configuration the volunteer spoke at least 9 phrases. This
number indicates which phrase it is out of all the phrases spoken for that sample
The resulting filename looks like this: 11-1PR-S2-E6-M7-C8-01
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Table 6: Number of Samples Spoken.
Sample Type Number of Samples
0PR 1926
1PR 4923
2PR 4923
Total 11772
Shown in Table 6 are the number of samples collected at each point of replay.
The word sample refers to each 6 second audio file that can have any phrase
listed in Table 1. The 0PR samples are the original bonafide phrases used.
The 0PR files are replayed multiple times with unique microphone and speaker
configurations to create the 1PR and 2PR samples.
4. Experiments and Results
To indicate the significance of our dataset, we performed different experi-
ments to evaluate its performance against two well-known datasets: ASVspoof
2019 and ASVspoof 2017 [2, 3]. Since constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC)
features and gaussian mixture model (GMM) classifier were used for evaluation
of ASVspoof 2017 and 2019, we used the same method for fair comparison.
We used the CQCC-GMM model for performance evaluation since it is rec-
ommended as a baseline model by the ASVspoof. We used only ASVspoof
baseline methods as the experiments were designed to measure the significance
of our dataset to compare performance with ASVspoof datasets. For evalua-
tion, ASVspoof 2017 used the metric of equal error rate (EER) while ASVspoof
2019 employed min-tDCF (tandem-decision cost function) along-with the EER.
Therefore, we used the EER metric for ASVspoof 2017 and, EER and min-tDCF
metrics [4] for ASVspoof 2019 to evaluate the performance.
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4.1. Experiment-1: Training on ASVspoof dataset
We designed one experiment to investigate the capability of the ASV anti-
spoofing system for replay detection in more diverse conditions. For this pur-
pose, we trained the ASVspoof 2017 baseline CQCC-GMM model on the train-
ing samples of ASVspoof 2017 database version-2 [2] and tested it on both the
ASVspoof 2017 dataset (development + evaluation) and our voice spoof detec-
tion corpus (VSDC) [10]. ASV 2017 baseline model provided an EER of 29.95%
on the evaluation set and 12.08% on the development set of ASVspoof 2017,
however the performance of baseline method degrades significantly on VSDC
resulting in EER of 47.68%. Similarly, we trained the ASVspoof 2019 baseline
CQCC-GMM model using the training samples of ASVspoof 2019 dataset [3]
and evaluated on both the ASVspoof 2019 dataset (development + evaluation)
and VSDC. We obtained an EER and min-tDCF of 22.66% and 0.414 on ASV
development dataset, and 23.16% and 0.624 on ASV evaluation dataset. More-
over, we achieved an EER and min-tDCF of 30.65% and 0.636 respectively on
VSDC. The results of EER are shown in Figure 6, whereas Figure 7 shows min-
tDCF values.
As the ASVspoof baseline method is trained on the audio samples collected in
the indoor environments with minimum distance between the speaker and mi-
crophone, therefore, we ensured to create a diverse spoofing dataset by recording
and playback in different environments (ambient background noise to anechoic
recording chamber), using different recordings and playback devices to main-
tain diversity in acoustics signatures, and recordings in multi-hop scenarios.
The results presented in Figure 6 clearly illustrate that ASV counter-preventive
(CP) model has dependency on the environment, recording and playback set-
tings/scenarios which makes this model unable to accurately detect the replay
attacks under diverse environment conditions, and recording and playback sce-
narios.
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Figure 6: Error Rate of ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 baseline methods on ASVspoof and Proposed
VSDC Datasets.
Figure 7: tDCF value for ASV 2019 baseline method on (a) ASVspoof 2019 dataset, and (b)
Proposed VSDC.
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4.2. Experiment-2: Training on ASVspoof and VSDC
To test our hypothesis that training the anti-spoofing system with more
diverse dataset containing the attributes mentioned previously can enhance
the performance of the baseline model, we designed our second experiment
to train the ASVspoof baseline model on the combined corpus comprising of
both the ASVspoof and our VSDC samples. We performed this experiment in
two stages. First, we trained the baseline model on the combined corpus of
ASVspoof 2017 training and VSDC followed by testing on the ASVspoof 2017
evaluation dataset. We achieved an EER of 25.24% on this combined corpus
that is 4.71% lesser than the EER obtained by the model trained only on the
ASVspoof dataset. In the second stage, we trained the baseline model on the
combined corpus of ASVspoof 2019 training dataset and VSDC and tested it
only on the ASVspoof 2019 evaluation dataset. We obtained an EER of 15.79%
and 17.39% for ASVspoof 2019 development and evaluation datasets as shown
in Figure 8. These results are 6.87% and 5.77% lesser than the EER achieved on
the model trained only on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset. In addition, min-tDCF
of 0.326 and 0.347 is achieved for development and evaluation dataset as plot-
ted in Figure 9. From the results (Figure 8 and 9) of this experiment we can
conclude that training the anti-spoofing model with additional audio samples
collected in more diverse settings and scenarios can enhance the performance of
the anti-spoofing model.
4.3. Experiment-3: Training on proposed VSDC for multi-order replay attacks
Our VSDC is unique to existing spoofing datasets in the way that we fur-
ther categorize the spoofing samples into first-order and second-order replay
attacks. We already demonstrated through experiments in our previous work
[5] that ASV systems like Google Home and Amazon Alexa are even vulnerable
to multi-hop scenarios (i.e. second-order replay attacks). Therefore, we argue
that anti-spoofing systems must have the capability to accurately detect the
second-order replay attacks as well besides the first-order replays. To test the
effectiveness of our dataset in this perspective, we performed an experiment in
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Figure 8: Error Rate of ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 baseline methods trained on ASVspoof and
ASVspoof-VSDC Datasets.
Figure 9: tDCF value for ASVspoof 2019 baseline method on ASVspoof 2019 (a) development
dataset, (b) evaluation dataset.
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two stages, one using the bonafide and first-order replay samples, and second
using the bonafide and second-order replay samples.
In the first stage of this experiment, we evaluated the performance of ASV
baseline method on our dataset using only the bonafide and first-order replay
samples. For this purpose, we used 60% samples to train the ASV baseline
method where half of the samples belong to the bonafide and rest to first-order
replays. ASV baseline method provided an average EER of 20.54% on our
dataset of bonafide and first-order replay samples as shown in Figure 10. In the
second stage of this experiment, we evaluated the ASV baseline method using
only the bonafide and second-order replay samples. We used similar experimen-
tal settings as adopted for first-stage experiment (60% for training and 40% for
testing) and obtained an average EER of 10.74% (Figure 10). The results of this
experiment indicate that the first-order replays are more challenging to detect
as compared to second-order replay attacks indicating the fact that the char-
acteristics of playback devices have some correlation with the spoof samples.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an audio replay spoofing dataset with the moti-
vation to address the limitations of existing replay spoofing datasets. In com-
parison of existing datasets like ASVspoof, our proposed dataset is diverse in
terms of recording and playback scenarios (i.e. second-order replay attack, etc.),
devices, environment, etc. According to the best of our knowledge, it is the first
attempt to create an audio spoofing dataset for multi-hop scenarios. After per-
formance evaluation of ASVspoof baseline method on the proposed dataset we
witnessed a significant performance degradation due to more diverse scenarios
of our dataset. On the other hand, the baseline model trained on different di-
verse scenarios eventually found to perform better than the previous case. It
has also been observed after experimentation that the discrimination between
the bonafide and first-order replay samples is more challenging as compared to
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Figure 10: Error Rate of ASVspoof baseline method on First-order and Second-order Replay
Samples of the Proposed VSDC.
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second-order replay samples. Moreover, we conclude that the characteristics of
playback devices must also be thoroughly investigated to identify the difference
in features of the first-order replay and second-order replay spoofing samples.
The proposed dataset contributes to the existing spoofing dataset mainly through
adding more diversity in playback scenarios (i.e. multi-hop replay attack),
recording environments, and professional microphones. ASVspoof being a crowd-
source dataset possess enough diversity in terms of recording devices, environ-
ments, and playback scenarios and can be used to evaluate anti-spoofing meth-
ods for both replay attacks and cloning. On the contrary, our dataset is specif-
ically designed for multi-order replay spoofing detection and diverse enough to
be effectively used to evaluate the replay anti-spoofing methods. As we already
discussed the importance of multi-hop replay attacks in MoT environment, our
dataset can reliably be used to evaluate the performance of anti-spoofing sys-
tems capable of handling the multi-order replays. However, ASVspoof dataset is
unable to handle the multi-hop replay scenario that also indicates the potential
gap in ASVspoof dataset. Therefore, we argue that the proposed VSDC can
effectively be used to develop more robust anti-spoofing methods under diverse
recording and playback configurations, replay scenarios including multi-order
replay attacks, and recording and playback environments.
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